Democracy In Addition To Its Discontents: Should The Results Of The European Parliament Elections Lift One's Heed The Adjacent President Of The European Commission?
November 28, 2018
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Steve Peers
It is highly unlikely that the adjacent President of the European Commission volition endure decided past times the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Law sets the framework inwards which elections convey place, but ordinarily does non straight touching on upon the outcome - although at that topographic point are of import especial cases to the contrary, such every bit the American election of 2000.
The election of the Commission President inwards 2014 is too an especial case, at to the lowest degree to the extent that the rules receive got changed as well as their interpretation is contested. Previously the President was appointed past times the European Council, later approving of its preferred nominee past times the European Parliament. The novel rules, which were introduced past times the Treaty of Lisbon as well as are instantly existence applied for the start time, instantly specify that the President is 'elected' past times the European Parliament, on the footing of a nomination past times the European Council, 'taking delineate of piece of occupation concern human relationship of' the results of the election to the European Parliament.
At start glance, the rules receive got non actually changed, given that the European Council anyway has assumed since 1999 that the Commission President had to come upwards from the same political background every bit the largest political party inwards the European Parliament. However, the bulk of European political parties convey the persuasion that the Treaty amendments hateful that they should nominate their preferred candidate for the project of Commission President earlier the elections, as well as that the candidate preferred past times the political party winning the most seats should endure the adjacent Commission President.
They convey this persuasion non solely because of the alter inwards the rules, but too because of the to a greater extent than fundamental political consideration that enhancing the link betwixt the election to the Parliament as well as the Commission President selection would heighten the democratic legitimacy of the EU. Voters would endure selecting the European Union executive inwards the same way that the votes inwards national parliamentary elections select the executive inwards Member United States of America alongside parliamentary systems.
However, this interpretation is non uncontested. The ECR political party (technically the AECR party, inwards the election), which includes the British Conservatives, volition non mention a candidate, since it objects inwards regulation to the link betwixt elections to the European Parliament as well as the selection of the Commission President, as well as is running wholly national campaigns instead. The EFD party, which includes the Britain Independence Party, volition non mention a candidate either. Moreover, Angela Merkel, the German linguistic communication Chancellor, does non receive got whatsoever automatic link betwixt the. EP elections as well as the nomination of the Commission President. Finally, the Britain Labour political party doesn't back upwards the candidate chosen past times the Party of European Socialists every bit its nominee for Commission President, although it nevertheless agrees inwards regulation to the thought of the parties nominating such candidates.
The ECR political party objects to the thought of the European Parliament elections deciding the Commission President on grounds of democraticy legitimacy, because it believes that at that topographic point is no world demand for the movement as well as that the principal method of legitimacy of European Union policies should endure via the mans of national governments. H5N1 detailed critique of the idea, past times Heather Grabbe as well as Stephan Lehne for the Centre for European Reform, too objects to the proposal on a number of grounds.
Post-election scenarios
It's ever risky to gauge the results of a political process, but it's necessary inwards this illustration because the thought of a 'partisan' Commission President can't endure judged without making sure assumptions virtually what volition occur at the fourth dimension of the adjacent appointment. The Grabbe/Lehner newspaper suggests 3 scenarios: (a) the EP wins the declaration as well as the largest party's candidate is proposed past times the European Council without demur; (b) a deadlock betwixt the European Parliament as well as European Council results over the appointment; as well as (c) a backroom bargain is done. They were writing inwards Oct 2013, when (c) seemed to a greater extent than probable; inwards the meantime, the European People's Party looks less probably (as they had assumed) to win the largest number of seats, as well as is going ahead alongside its invention to nominate a candidate.
However, at that topographic point could soundless endure a messy deadlock. Whichever political party wins the most seats inwards the European Parliament inwards the May elections volition non handgrip a bulk of the seats, due to the application of proportional representation voting every bit required past times the European Union Treaties. So for it to vote downwards the preferred nominee of the European Council, it volition demand the back upwards of another parties. Equally it volition demand the back upwards of another parties for its preferred candidate for President to endure elected - assuming that the European Council puts that mention forrard inwards the start place. If the European Council fails to set that mention forward, at that topographic point could indeed endure a deadlock.
Having said that, it should endure recalled that the European Parliament has ever sought to heighten its role inwards the appointment of the Commission. It began to handgrip hearings for nominees to the Commission fifty-fifty earlier it gained a decisive role inwards its appointment. And when the final ii Commissions were appointed, it found a way to spend upwards private nominees, fifty-fifty though the Treaties don't render for this. It powerfulness thus endure expected that if it comes to it, a bulk of MEPs would veto whatsoever candidate for Commission President who is non the nominee of the largest party, as well as that the European Council volition recognise reality accordingly. In effect, when it comes to appointment of the Commission President, the European Council would popular off the equivalent of a constitutional monarch similar Queen Elizabeth II.
Is the 'election' of the Commission President via the European Parliament elections a skillful idea?
Just because it seems to endure increasingly probably to happen, does non necessarily hateful that it is a skillful idea. Let's expression start of all at 1 laid of arguments advanced past times Grabbe/Lehne, concerning its potential number on the effectiveness of the Commission. First of all, they fighting that a 'partisan' Commission President could non practise his or her project effectively, given the number of Commission tasks which require objective assessment, namely economical governance, nation aids, competition, human rights as well as infringement actions. Secondly, they fighting that a President elected via the EP elections powerfulness non endure a leading political figure, as well as would endure less able to piece of occupation closely alongside national governments. Thirdly, he or she would endure beholden to the EP, as well as thus his or her initiatives would endure blocked past times the Council, resulting inwards the legislative gridlock familiar to Americans. Fourthly, given that the other Commissioners are chosen past times the Member States, it is possible that the President comes from 1 political party as well as the bulk of Commissioners volition come upwards from the opposing political background.
The minute laid of arguments concern the legitimacy as well as democratic credentials of the notion. Here the Grabbe/Lehne declaration overlaps alongside the ECR's explanation of its position. Both fighting that the EP is remote from its constituents, as well as that enhancing the link alongside the selection of the Commission President volition non alter this, given that the candidates volition non receive got broad recognition.
These are all valid arguments inwards principle, then let's examine them 1 past times one. First of all, it should non endure forgotten that many of the Commission's to a greater extent than technical tasks receive got been transferred to European Union agencies, as well as that its chief project remains the proposal of legislation. There are plainly political choices to endure made virtually which legislation is proposed past times the Commission, as well as virtually the content of Commission measures implementing it. State assist as well as challenger decisions are anyway dependent acre to objective rules as well as tin endure challenged inwards the courts, as well as the Commission's infringement actions receive got to endure made out inwards court. It would be a skillful idea, if the Commission President were 'partisan', to found mechanisms to ensure that the less political aspects of its decision-making are dissever from its political choices. But this is non impossible: see, for instance, the separation of the European Central Bank's functions every bit regards (politically accountable) banking supervision from its role every bit an independent key bank. Anyway, the Grabbe/Lehner declaration forgets that since 1999, the Commission President has already been chosen from the political party which won the most seats inwards the EP - without whatsoever sign of contamination of the Commission's to a greater extent than technical tasks.
Secondly, spell it seems probably that the adjacent Commission President volition non endure a quondam Prime Minister (unlike the final 3 Presidents). However, this is non a guarantee of effectiveness: the most effective Presidents (Hallstein as well as Delors) had non been Prime Ministers, whle the to the lowest degree effective President (Santer) had been. This delineate of declaration assumes that neither the Member United States of America nor the Commission President volition brand whatsoever elbow grease to piece of occupation effectively alongside the other, but this seems unlikely. The history of the European Union shows a continuing endeavour to attain a broad consensus betwixt institutions. Similarly, every bit regards the tertiary argument, whatsoever Commission President is saltation to know that his or her initiatives receive got to obtain the back upwards of a to the lowest degree a qualified bulk inwards the Council.
The 4th argument (the partisan mix of the Commission) is peradventure the strongest point. To depict an analogy, it is hard plenty for the British Conservative political party to receive got that it has to regulation alongside a minority of Liberal Democrats inwards the cabinet. So how could a authorities piece of occupation if David Cameron were Prime Minister, alongside a majority of cabinet members from the Labour party?
The response is that the European Union institutions too seek broad consensus within them. In fact, due to the different makeup of the different governments of the Member States, the Commissioners receive got ever had a broad mix of political backgrounds. Also, the Grabbe/Lehner thesis overlooks the Treaty provisions which seek to reinforce the influence of the Commission President: the requirement of all Commissioners to piece of occupation nether his guidance as well as her powerfulness to sack private Commissioners. The added legitimacy of indirect election of the President would solely reinforce this. Plus, every bit noted above, the Commission President volition demand the back upwards of several political parties to endure elected anyway. Finally, a to a greater extent than radical response to this critique is that the EP should popular off further, expecting the political parties to nominate an entire squad of Commissioners which would constitute the adjacent Commission. So far, of course, this footstep has non been taken.
As for the declaration virtually political legitimacy, the poll which the ECR commissioned to justify its determination non to run a candidate was real interesting. While large numbers of voters were critical of the EU's legitimacy, as well as were non familiar alongside the names of the candidates for Commission President, the bigger per centum of respondents agreed that they were 'happy' alongside the thought of the vote for the EP elections determining who would popular off Commission President, because this would brand the European Union to a greater extent than democratic. This was specially pronounced inwards Poland, where the poll of Poles (I couldn't resist) indicated that 50% supported the idea, spell solely 19% were opposed. The thought was too supported inwards France, Italy as well as Spain, but opposed inwards Federal Republic of Federal Republic of Germany as well as the Britain - which makes the British Conservative topographic point (and peradventure too the Britain Labour Party's contortions) understandable. In whatsoever event, the poll suggests that many of those who think the European Union lacks legitimacy would endure 'happy' alongside the thought of enhancing that legitimacy past times way of the indirect election of the Commission President. And how many people had heard of Barroso, inwards Feb 2004? Or Obama, inwards Jan 2008?
This is ultimately the decisive declaration inwards favour of indirect election - the demand to endeavour to forge a greater democratic link betwixt European Union citizens as well as the Union. The thought sure enough has its flaws, but for the reasons laid out above, the existing European Union institutional organization tin accommodate to accommodate it. Those flaws are outweighed past times the advantages of seizing the chance to convey a pregnant footstep towards democratising the EU, as well as giving the voters an opportunity, all the same indirect, to (in Weiler's terms) 'throw the rascals out'. Nor does it hateful that the European Union necessarily becomes to a greater extent than centralised. In my view, the debate on the time to come of the European Union could solely receive got benefited from (for instance) John Major setting out the ECR's illustration across Europe for a less centralised, less regulated European Union focussing on gratis trade.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 3
