Only Nixon Could Become To China: Could Juncker Hold Upwards A Reformist Committee President?

 

Steve Peers

Just as all observers of British politics know that ‘a calendar week is a long fourth dimension inward politics’, their American counterparts know that ‘only Nixon could perish to China’. The basic thought behind the latter catchphrase is that simply a pol with a firmly established reputation could convince his or her supporters to dorsum a meaning modify of course. In Nixon’s case, simply a job solid anti-Communist could convince American conservatives that a rapprochement with Communist PRC was a skilful idea.  

Could this regulation endure relevant to the European Union? The most recent elections for the European Parliament (EP) resulted inward an increased vote for anti-EU parties inward a number of Member States. As a result, it has been argued past times David Cameron too others that Jean-Claude Juncker, who is the preferred candidate to endure the adjacent President of the European Commission of the political political party which won the most seats inward the EP (the ‘European People’s Party’ or EPP), should non endure the adjacent President, because he is non reformist plenty as he is also much of an ‘old hand’ inward European Union politics. But it is arguable that inward fact, a policy of European Union reform could simply endure carried out past times a candidate with a skilful understanding of how the existing organisation works, too how to utilization it.

Secondly, it has been argued inward recent days that the rattling thought of selecting a Commission President based on the nomination of the political party which wins the largest number of seats inward the EP is incorrect inward regulation – or conversely that it is undemocratic too unprincipled. But the improve persuasion is that neither of these views is correct. Rather, the Treaty drafters created a organisation of dual legitimacy for the pick of the President, albeit 1 which provides for a greater run for the European Parliament than before.

These 2 arguments are developed below (in opposite order). But first, a petty background for those novel to the number (given that the press has ignored it until recently).

Background

Traditionally, the Commission President was chosen past times the heads of State too authorities of European Union Member States unanimously. Over time, the national veto was removed too so the European Council (which consists of those heads of Blue Planet too government) votes past times a qualified bulk on his issue. Also over time, the European Parliament was given the ability to approve the nominee for President, although it has never rejected a nominee inward practice.

The Treaty of Lisbon kept this underlying physical care for intact, but refers to it differently. Now Article 17 TEU states that the Parliament ‘elects’ the Commission President. But the somebody which the EP votes is silent nominated past times the European Council, although the Treaty at nowadays also states that the latter trunk shall ‘take into account’ the results of the EP elections.

Following the entry into forcefulness of the Treaty of Lisbon, the bulk of European Union political parties (the EPP, the Socialists, the Greens, the Left political party too the Liberals) decided to nominate their preferred candidate for Commission President, on the supposition that the somebody nominated past times the largest political party ought to teach the President of the Commission next the elections. The persons nominated past times the parties receive got teach known as ‘Spitzenkandidaten’. It was never clear, however, whether the European Council would convey this process.

The physical care for for selecting the Commission President

In a previous post on this blog, written before the elections, I argued that despite closed to cogent arguments against the thought of the Spitzenkandidaten, inward regulation the thought should endure supported as a movement towards greater democratisation of the EU.

Let’s revisit the declaration inward lite of the post-election furore, inward which at that topographic point are competing contentions (as mentioned above) that simply a predominant run for the European Council, or for the European Parliament, would endure democratic. Neither of these views is convincing.

First of all, the legal arguments. The Treaty clearly gives a run to the European Council, non simply the European Parliament, as regards the physical care for leading to the election of a Commission President. If the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon had actually wanted to take away the run of the European Council entirely, they could too would receive got done so. But they retained the run of that trunk inward selecting the nominee for President.

On the other hand, the Treaty drafters non simply retained the run of the European Parliament, but enhanced it, adding references to its run ‘electing’ the President too the requirement for the European Council to convey the election results into account. If the Treaty drafters had non wanted to heighten the run of the EP, they would non receive got made these amendments. The best persuasion is thence that, as before, both institutions play a meaning run inward the appointment of the Commission President – but the EP, rather than the European Council, plays the atomic number 82 run inward that process.

Secondly, the broader political arguments. Asserting that either the EP or the European Council should endure regarded as the sole or chief origin of republic inward the European Union is risible. They both receive got democratic legitimacy – as expressly recognised past times Article 10(2) TEU, which refers as to the forthwith representation of citizens inward the European Parliament too their indirect representation, via national parliaments too governments, inward the European Council (and the Council, made upwards of national ministers).

This dual legitimacy is reflected throughout the European Union legal order, inward the cast of the ordinary legislative procedure, the annual budget process, the European Parliament’s ability of consent over a number of Council acts (for instance, most treaties to endure concluded past times the Council), too the ability of either the EP or the Council to command delegated acts to endure adopted past times the Commission. In closed to cases (for instance, taxation legislation), the Council has greater ability than the EP, but sometimes the opposite is truthful (for instance, simply the EP tin forcefulness the resignation of the entire Commission; this is clearly consistent with an increasing run for the EP inward appointing it). It logically follows that simply a Commission President who commands wide back upwards from both the European Parliament and the Member States tin produce the labor effectively.

But what does all this hateful inward practice? It way that the increased run of the EP inward the election of the Commission President ought to endure respected. So the European Council ought to consider, commencement too foremost, the scream of whichever of the Spitzenkandidaten could perhaps command a bulk of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The commencement such scream is Juncker, given that his political party got the biggest number of seats too a large bulk of EP parties receive got already supported the thought that he endeavour to obtain a bulk inward the EP first.

However, as the European Union organisation currently stands, the European Council should non endure expected to approve this scream without farther ado, but should retain the right to inquire the candidate to brand specific commitments inward guild to satisfy the broadest possible bulk of Member States that he or she should endure appointed.

In particular, inward lite of the increased vote for anti-European parties, it is to a greater extent than than reasonable to aspect the adjacent Commission President to commit himself or herself to meaning reform of the EU. The query is thence whether Juncker, described past times closed to as a federalist supporting greater European integration, is the right somebody to bear out that reform.

Can Juncker endure a reformist?

The starting house for assessing whether Juncker tin endure a ‘reformist’ Commission President is his own listing of v priorities. These include a commitment to verbalize over a possible renegotiation of Great Britain membership of the EU, referring expressly to David Cameron’s ain listing of demands (which were discussed inward an earlier weblog post). At the same time, closed to other Juncker priority is a bigger run for the EU, inward relation to monetary spousal human relationship – but as regards the Eurozone Member States only, specifically exempting the UK.

Another Juncker priority is the completion of negotiations (already underway) for a costless merchandise bargain betwixt the European Union too the United States. This prospect is increasingly controversial (at to the lowest degree inward the EU), although it is difficult to guess its merits at acquaint without having whatsoever thought what the terminal bargain volition consist of. However, the thought of such a bargain appears to receive got wide back upwards across the UK’s political spectrum. If it is agreed, it volition confound the declaration of those who say that the Great Britain needs to teach out the European Union inward guild to increment its merchandise with non-EU countries. But if it is non agreed, so those arguments volition endure confirmed, at to the lowest degree inward component subdivision (the European Union has negotiated, too is negotiating, costless merchandise deals with many other countries).

Admittedly, Juncker’s listing of priorities places qualifications on his back upwards for an EU/US costless merchandise deal, inward detail as regards nutrient security too information protection laws. But reservations similar these are shared inward a number of national capitals too parliaments too alongside a number of MEPs. They must endure addressed if whatsoever merchandise understanding is to receive got whatsoever take chances of existence ratified. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 to a greater extent than evangelical too uncritical supporter of an EU/US merchandise understanding would perhaps non endure able to persuade as many governments or parliamentarians to back upwards the terminal deal. In particular, the European Parliament powerfulness at nowadays comprise to a greater extent than MEPs who oppose a potential deal, but Juncker, as the commencement ever Spitzenkandidate to convey office, powerfulness endure best placed to convince them to back upwards it.

Juncker’s other 2 priorities job organisation growth-related policies such as the digital unmarried market, too an liberate energy spousal human relationship for the EU. Both these ideas receive got wide back upwards across the European Union too are non specifically or necessarily federalist. Indeed, the evolution of the EU’s unmarried marketplace has ever been at the forefront of the reasons for the Conservative party’s back upwards of the EU.

So Juncker’s priorities are non as federalist as has been suggested, too already include closed to elements of reform. Certainly, to a greater extent than reform is needed: the adjacent Commission should ensure that the European Union is to a greater extent than transparent, devolves to a greater extent than ability to Member States where at that topographic point is a skilful representative for this, too addresses other populace concerns.

Therefore, the European Council should asking specific commitments from Juncker on these sorts of issues. But it should non endure forgotten that the Commission President volition non endure the simply fauna inward the EU’s political jungle. Any proposed legislation volition silent receive got to endure agreed inward the EP too the Council. More broadly, Member States laid the wide political administration of the European Union when their leaders come across inward the European Council, too receive got total ability to appoint the President of that trunk (Herman van Rompuy cannot endure reappointed to that labor afterward 1 Nov 2014).

And political innovations are ever possible. For instance, the European Council could laid a high-level body, including (for instance) Tony Blair too Nicolas Sarkozy, to study dorsum inward the close time to come with a listing of specific recommendations on reform of the EU. Juncker could endure asked to commit to a strong run for a (British?) Vice-President of the Commission inward accuse of the reform process. More specifically, it powerfulness endure useful for the European Council too the EP to grip a laid of mutual rules, inward the cast of a articulation declaration or inter-institutional agreement, as regards their respective roles inward the physical care for for selecting the Commission President.

For an European Union reform policy to work, a Commission President with stronger links to the European Parliament powerfulness receive got a improve take chances of seeing policies supported inward that institution, too an ‘old hand’ at European Union politics volition know to a greater extent than nearly how to teach things done inward do than a newcomer. Juncker is the simply candidate who has both strong links to the EP too intergovernmental experience. The electrical flow argument over his potential appointment could endure resolved if his critics could admit that indeed, simply Nixon could receive got gone to China.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 3

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